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Defendant-Respondent

Allen

Forsyth

(Forsyth),

through his undersigned counsel, submits the following

by

and

brief.

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction
Article
Ann.

VIII,

§78-2-2

Section
(1953 a s

Utah Supreme

in

this

3 of

the

Court

is

proper

Constitution

amended),

of

and R u l e 3 of

pursuant

Utah,

Utah

to
Code

t h e R u l e s of

the

Court.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The p r o c e e d i n g s
for

partial

summary

judgment.

The

plaintiffs1

motion.

below

consisted

judgment

and

court

grated

lower

of

Forsyth's

plaintiffs1
motion

Forsythfs

motion

for

motion

summary

and

denied

Should t h i s Court affirm the t r i a l c o u r t ' s

ruling

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

t h a t pursuant t o Utah Code Ann. §32-11-2, Forsyth is not subject
t o dram shop l i a b i l i t y

and p l a i n t i f f s

may not maintain

their

action against Forsyth?
2.
that

Forsyth

Should
is

§ 63-30-10(1)(i)

this

Court

immune from

affirm

suit

the

pursuant

trial
to the

court's

ruling

provisions

of

of U t a h ' s G o v e r n m e n t a l Immunity Act?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

The
considered

following

determinative

provisions
of

this
-1-

from Utah Code A n n o t a t e d

appeal.

The p r o v i s i o n s

are

are
set

forth below as they existed in July 1984 at the time the accident
which gave rise to this action occurred.
32-11-1.
Liability for injuries resulting from
illegal sale or other distribution of intoxicating
liquors - Injured person's cause of action against
intoxicated person or person who provided liquor Survival of action. (1) Any person who gives,
sells, or otherwise provides intoxicating liquor to
another contrary to subsection 16-6-13.1(8)(d)r
subsection 32-1-36.5(1)(1)f section 32-7-14 or
subsection 32-7-24(b) or (c), and thereby causes
the intoxication of the other person, is liable for
injuries in person, property, or means of support
to any third person, or the spouse, child, or
parent of
that person, resulting
from the
intoxication.
(2) A person who suffers an injury referred to in
subsection (1) of this section, shall have a cause
of action against the intoxicated person and the
person who provided the intoxicating liquor in
violation of subsection (1) above, or either of
them.
(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under
this section dies, the rights or liabilities
provided by this section shall survive to or
against that person's estate.
32-11-2.
Immunity of statef state agencies and
employees9
and
political
subdivisions.
No
provision of this act shall create any civil
liability on the part of the state, its agencies,
employees, or political subdivisions, arising out
of their activities in regulating, controlling,
authorizing, or otherwise being involved in, the
sale or other distribution of intoxicating liquor.

63-30-3.
Immunity of governmental entities from
suit. Except as may be otherwise provided in this
-2-

chapter, all governmental entities are immune from
suit for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental
health care facility, and from an approved medical,
nursing, or other professional health care clinical
training program conducted in either public or
private facilities.
The
management
of
flood
waters
and
the
construction, repair, and operation of flood and
storm
systems
by
governmental
entities
are
considered to be governmental functions, and
governmental entities and their officers and
employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from those activities.
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by
negligent act or omission of employee—ExceptionsWaiver for injury caused by violation of fourth
amendment rights.
(1) Immunity from suit of all
governmental
entities
is waived
for
injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission
of an employee committed within the scope of
employment except if the injury:
. . .

(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah
National Guard. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action seeking damages resulting from the

death of plaintiffs1 decedent, Jacquelyn Brinkerhoff.

Jacquelyn

Brinkerhoff was killed while riding a bicycle when struck by a
vehicle owned by defendant Walter K. Christensen and driven by
defendant

Alexander J. Aerts

sought damages

against Aerts
-3-

(Aerts).

Plaintiffs1

for negligent

complaint

operation of the

vehicle and against defendant Walter K. Christensen and defendant
Conrad Christensen, a passenger in the vehicle, under a theory of
negligent entrustment.

The complaint also sought damages against

Forsyth pursuant to Utah's Dram Shop Act, Utah Code Ann. §32-11-1
et seq.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendants

plaintiffs

by

Christensens

payment

of

and

$150,000, and

dismissed as to those defendants.

partial

summary

judgment

case

has

with
been

Plaintiffs filed a motion

seeking

Forsyth's defense of governmental

the

settled

Following that dismissal, the

case continued solely against Forsyth.
for

Aerts

a determination

immunity.

as to

Forsyth filed a

separate motion for summary judgment.
C.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The motions were heard together by the trial court, the

Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding.

Forsyth's motion for

summary judgment was granted and plaintiffs' motion for partial
summary judgment was denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1 . At the time of the accident which forms the basis
of

this

action, Forsyth was employed

full time by the Utah

National Guard as a mechanic at Camp Williams, Utah.

-4-

He also

held a part-time evening job as a bartender at the Camp Williams
NCO Club, a self sustaining instrumentatility of the State of
Utah.

(Record, at p. 77.) (The Record will hereafter be referred

to as "R. , at p.
2.

." )

On the evening of July 21, 1984, Forsyth in his

employment as bartender served intoxicating liquor to defendant
Aerts in the Camp Williams NCO Club.
3.

(R., at pp. 18 & 77.)

Some time after Aerts left the Camp Williams NCO

Club on July 2 1, 1984, the vehicle he was operating struck and
killed plaintiffs' decedent.
alcohol content of .19.

Aerts was found to have a blood

(R., at pp. 15, 16, & 77.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

In 1981, the Utah legislature enacted the Dram Shop

Act creating a previously nonexistent cause of action against one
furnishing liquor in favor of those injured by the intoxication
of the person who was provided liquor.

Section 32-11-2 of the

Dram Shop Act excludes the state and its employees from that
newly imposed liability where the liability arises out of the
activities

of

the

state

and

its

employees

in

regulating,

controlling, authorizing, or otherwise being involved in the sale
of intoxicating liquor.

Since the liability plaintiffs attempt

to impose on Forsyth arises out of his activities while involved

-5-

in

the

sale

liability

of

and p l a i n t i f f s
2.

constitute
for

the

intoxicating

The

activities

a "governmental

negligent

acts

the

activities

activities

were

immune from

of

Forsyth

is

not

subject

may n o t b r i n g t h e i r a c t i o n a g a i n s t
of

the

function".

of

state

immunity h a s s p e c i f i c a l l y
of

liquorf

Utah
While

employees

been r e s e r v e d

t h e Utah

activities

National

of

the

has

for

Guard

from

suit

been w a i v e d ,

such

injuries

Guard.

Utah

him,

National
immunity

to

arising

Since

National

out

Forsyth's

Guard,

he

is

suit.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PURSUANT TO § 3 2 - 1 1 - 2 , FORSYTH IS NOT
SUBJECT TO DRAM SHOP LIABILITY

In
alleges

that

Brinkerhoff
then

the

that

suit.

pursuant

is
to

of

action,

liable

the

for

plaintiffs'

the

provisions

of

trial

to

§32-11-2,

court's

ruling

death

seg.

Forsyth
was

was

correct

complaint

of

Utah's

Utah Code Ann. § 3 2 - 1 1 - 1 e t

pursuant

The

cause

Forsyth

in e f f e c t ,

ruled

third

Jacquelyn

Dram Shop
The t r i a l
not
and

Act

court

subject

to

should

be

affirmed.
The
Forsyth
Utah's

was

cause

of

action

unknown

at

common l a w .

Dram Shop

Act

there

which

plaintiffs
Prior

was no c a u s e
-6-

of

to

allege

against

the

enactment

of

action

against

one

furnishing liquor in favor of those injured by the intoxication
of the person who was provided liquor.
P.2d

Seey Yost v. State, 640

1044 (Utah 1981) and 45 Am Jur 2d. Intoxicating Liquors f

§§553 and 554.
By enactment of the Dram Shop Act in 1981, the Utah
legislature created a previously nonexistent cause of action.
The first section of the Dram Shop Act, §32-11-1, contains the
substantive provisions which statutorily created the new cause of
action for dram shop liability.
person

That section provides that any

"who gives, sells, or otherwise provides

intoxicating

liquor to another", under certain circumstances, and thereby
causes the intoxication of the other person is liable in injuries
to any third person resulting from the intoxication.
While

§32-11-1

contains

the

substantive

provisions

creating the new cause of action, §32-11-2 contains a provision
exempting

the

state,

its

agencies, employees, or

political

subdivisions from the newly created liability imposed by §32-111.

Section 32-11-2 states as follows:
No provision of this act shall create any civil
liability on the part of the state, its agencies,
employees, or political subdivisions, arising out
of their activities in regulating, controlling,
authorizing, or otherwise being involved in, the
sale or other distribution of intoxicating liquor.

(Emphasis added)
The language of §32-11-2 excluding the state and its
-7-

employees from dram shop liability is broad.

Section 32-11-2

plainly states that no provision of the Dram Shop Act shall
create any civil liability on the part of state employees arising
out of their activities in regulating, controlling, authorizing
or otherwise being involved in the sale of intoxicating liquor.
That language is broad and covers all activities where a state
employee, acting in his or her capacity as state employee, is
involved in the sale of intoxicating liquor.
The legislature could have narrowed the scope of §3211-2 but chose not to do so.

For example, one year earlier in

Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d

1230 (Utah 1980)

this Court construed the term "governmental function", as used in
the

Governmental

Immunity

Act,

to

relate

only

to

those

governmental activities of such a unique nature that they can
only be performed by a governmental agency or are essential to
the core of governmental activity.
legislature

could

have

Ibid at 123 6 and 1237. The

restricted

the

scope

of

§32-11-2's

exclusion from dram shop liability by indicating that the state,
its agencies, employees or political subdivisions were excluded
from

dram

shop

governmental
restrict

the

liability

function.
scope

of

only

when

they

were

exercising

However, the legislature
§32-11-2.

Instead

it

did

adopted

a

not so
broad

language which manifests an intention to exempt from dram shop
-8-

liability all state employees who, in their capacity as state
employees, are in any way involved in the sale of intoxicating
liquor.

This Court must assume that each term of the statute was

used advisedly and must give each term an interpretation and
application in accordance with their usually accepted meaning.
E.g., Board of Granite School District v. Salt Lake County, 659
P.2d

1030 (Utah 1983) and Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485

P.2d

1035 (Utah 1971).

exempts

state employees

The language of §32-11-2 is clear; it
involved

in the sale of intoxicating

liquor from the newly created civil liability imposed by the Dram
Shop Act.
The activities of Forsyth

as a state employee fall

squarely within the provisions of §32-11-2.

Forsyth, a state

employee, was involved, in his capacity as a state employee, in
the sale of intoxicating liquor.

Under those circumstances, §32-

11-2 mandates that no provision of the Dram Shop Act shall create
any civil liability on the part of Forsyth.

The plain language

of §32-11-2 allows for no other conclusion.
Plaintiffs

argue that the comments made by Senator

Jeffs indicate a legislative intention that the exclusion from
dram shop liability apply to the state and its employees only in
their capacity "as liquor wholesalers".
6.)

(Brief of appellants, p.

Plaintiffs1 argument is without merit for two reasons.
-9-

First, even if Senator Jeffs1 comments can be construed
to indicate that he believed the exclusion protected the state
and its employees only in their capacity as liquor wholesalers,
those comments are not a conclusive expression of legislative
intent.

The intent of the legislature

primarily
Brewers

from

the

legislation

Association,

Inc.

v.

should

itself.
Director

be determined

See, United
of

the

Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 668 P.2d
1983).

New

States
Mexico

1093 (N.M.

What may have been the intent of an individual legislator

may not have been the intent of the legislative body who enacted
the statute
483

(See, Johnson v. Continental West, Inc. , 66 3 P. 2d

(Wash. 1983)),

and

the views expressed

by an individual

legislator do not necessarily express the intent of the entire
legislative body.
1976).
when

See, Bouquet v. Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371 (Cal.

Moreover, the statements of one legislator—particularly
those

statements

were

made

on

the

last

day

of

the

legislative session "when the Legislature was in a frenzy to get
done with its business" (Brief of Appellants, p. 6)—should not
be considered a reliable expression of the intent of the entire
legislative body.

See, Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety,

530 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1975).
Secondly, and in any event, the interpretation advanced
by Forsyth and adopted by the trial court is not inconsistent
-10-

with the comments made by Senator Jeffs.

Neither Senator Jeffs1

comments nor the statute itself restrict the exclusion from dram
shop liability to only liability arising from activities of the
state or its employees in the wholesale liquor business.

Had the

Legislature intended so to restrict the exclusions, it would have
been a simple matter to include some language indicating that the
exclusion pertained only to activities relating to the wholesale
distribution of liquor.

The absence of such restrictive language

and the inclusion of broad language indicating that the state and
its employees are excluded from dram shop liability when they are
"otherwise involved in the sale of intoxicating liquor" indicate
an

intention

not

to

restrict

the

exclusion

from

dram

shop

liability as plaintiffs suggest.
Plaintiffs argue further that if Forsyth's argument is
accepted, absurd results will occur.

They argue that if the

provisions of §32-11-2 are applied literally, then merely as an
incident of employment by the state, state employees would be
entitled to immunity from dram shop liability, even with regard
to activities outside the scope of state employment.

Forsyth

agrees that such an interpretation would be absurd.

No such

contortion of the language of §32-11-2 is required, however, to
achieve

a rational

result

and to give the language of that

section reasonable effect according to its plain terms.
-11-

The more reasonable interpretation of §32-11-2 is that
it did not intend to provide state employees exclusion from dram
shop liability
employees.

in any context

simply because

they

are state

Rather, the language of §32-11-2 indicates that the

exclusion applies only as to those activities undertaken in the
course and scope of employment as a state employee.

Section 32-

11-2 states that no provision of the Dram Shop Act shall create
civil liability on the part of state employees "arising out of
their

activities

otherwise being

in regulating,
involved

controlling, authorizing, or

in, the sale

. . .

of intoxicating

1 iquor."
Forsyth, in his
"involved

in

the

sale

capacity

as a state

. . .

of

employee, was

intoxicating

liquor".

Accordingly, under the plain language of §32-11-2, he is not
subject

to

granting

dram

shop

Forsyth's

liability.

motion

for

The

trial

summary

court's

judgment

ruling

should

be

affirmed.
POINT II
PURSUANT TO §63-30-10(1)(i),
FORSYTH IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT
Forsyth's motion

for summary

judgment

in the lower

court was also based on the provisions of §63-30-10( 1 ) (i) which
preserves immunity from suit for injuries arising out of the
activities of the Utah National Guard. The trial court agreed
-12-

that §6 3—30 —10(1) (i) preserved immunity to Forsyth in this case
and granted Forsyth's motion for summary judgment.

The lower

court's ruling was correct and should be affirmed.
Section

63-30-10

is

part

of

Utah's

Governmental

Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1 et seg. The Act generally
retains immunity from suit for governmental entities except where
immunity is specifically waived by statute.
Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975).
from

suit

for

injuries

"governmental function".

resulting

See, Greenhalgh v.

The Act retains immunity
from

the exercise

of a

In that regard §63-30-3 provides as

follows:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from
suit for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function. . . .
In the case of Standiford v. Salt Lake Corp., 605 P.2d
1230 (Utah 1980), this Court established the standard for what
constitutes a "governmental function" in the exercise of which a
governmental entity is immune from suit.

In Standiford the Court

s t a t e d as follows:
[T]he t e s t for determining governmental immunity is
whether the a c t i v i t y under consideration i s of such
a unique nature t h a t i t can only be performed by a
governmental agency or t h a t i t i s e s s e n t i a l to the
core of governmental a c t i v i t y .

-13-

Id. at pp. 1236 and 1237.

The Court later held that this test

does not refer to what government may do but what government
alone must do.

Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 629 P.2d 432,

434 (Utah 1981).
There can be few clearer examples of activities of such
a unique nature that they can only be performed by a governmental
entity

or

activity

which
than

are

the

essential

activities

Government

alone

assembling,

training,

activities

of

has

the

the
and

Utah

to
of

the
the

core
Utah

responsibility
equipping

National

of

National

and

a national

Guard

governmental

plainly

Guard.

authority
guard.

of
The

constitute

a

"governmental function".
As

indicated

above,

the

Governmental

Immunity

Act

generally retains immunity except where specifically waived.

One

provision where such a specific waiver of immunity occurs is §6330-10.

This section waives

immunity

from suit for injuries

caused by a negligent act or omission or an employee.

However,

that section does not waive immunity for injuries arising "out of
the activities of the Utah National Guard".
30-10(1)(i).

Utah Code Ann. §63-

Therefore, immunity from suit for injuries arising

out of the activities of the Utah National Guard is preserved.
Plaintiffs

argue

that

Forsyth's

activities

constitute "activities of the Utah National Guard".
-14-

do

not

Plaintiffs

construe that language too narrowly.

Forsyth was employed not by

some private club but by the NCO Club located at Camp Williams, a
facility operated

by the Utah National Guard.

The club was

provided specifically for the benefit, enjoyment, and relaxation
of members of the Utah National Guard.

It is not just another

private club but is part of the overall function and operation of
the Utah National Guard.

Forsyth's activities while employed as

a bartender at the NCO Club constitute activities of the Utah
National Guard.

Pursuant to §63-30-3 and §63-30-10(1)(i) Forsyth

is immune from suit for injuries arising from those activities.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant/respondent Allen
Forsyth

respectfully

requests

the Court

to affirm

court's granting Forsyth's motion for summary judgment.
DATED this 22nd day of February, 1988.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

CARMAN E. KIPP
ROBERT H. REES
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